On the compatibility of the unification and the mechanistic approaches to explanation
Final Report Abstract
The two most influential accounts of scientific explanation are the unification approach and the mechanistic approach. The main object of inquiry in this project was whether the two approaches are compatible, and if yes, how exactly. The main result is that at least for the social sciences the unification and the mechanistic approach are compatible, not in the sense of a synthesis of the two approaches but in the sense of their accommodation of the existing scientific practices in different and distinct social scientific domains. Since it is commonly accepted that philosophy of science as a discipline can only be useful, if it takes the scientific practices seriously, and it is clearly the case that in different domains different kinds of scientific practices prevail, trying to establish a monolithic philosophical theory of explanation supposedly good for everything clearly cannot be an acceptable strategy. In a nutshell, the goal of a philosophical account of explanation should not be to capture the explanatory relation, but rather to capture the many ways in which explanations are provided in the different domains of science. The position that has emerged from the project then is that of an explanatory ecumenism. This is a pluralistic account which allows for different ideal types of explanation, i.e. different exemplary accounts of what an explanation consists of, which are good as a means of classification of different types of explanatory activities offered in different domains of the (social) sciences. The explanatory ecumenism that I propose is a genuinely pluralistic position which makes as few commitments as possible to causality (and other metaphysical issues). It does not preclude that explanations in some domains of science are offered, debated and criticized in terms of figuring out causal patterns, processes or mechanisms, but it also allows for scientific explanations which provide scientific understanding, for example, by unifying phenomena without invoking causes.
Publications
- Explanations of Meaningful Actions. Philosophy of the Social Sciences (published online on January 9th 2011)
Chrysostomos Mantzavinos
