Consequentialist demands, consequentialist reasons for action, and the authority of consequentialism
Final Report Abstract
According to consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal point of view. It is often claimed that this requirement is so demanding that it is unreasonable for any agent to follow it. This (over-)demandingness objection has been the focus of my project. The project assesses the truth of three claims that are needed for the objection to go through: there are reasons to act morally; there are reasons to act as consequentialism requires; consequentialist reasons override other conflicting reasons of the agent. The plan of the project was to argue for the truth of the first two claims, but reject the third claim as false. This has been partially accomplished in two articles. At the same time, the project has done significant work in further clarifying the demandingness objection. Finally, the project has led to several new and unplanned lines of inquiry. One concerns the question what kind of things reasons are; another discusses the empirical underpinning of the objection (do people really think that consequentialism is unreasonably demanding?); a third investigates new forms of consequentialism and the role of institutions in reducing demands on individuals. In their approach these inquiries form a broadly coherent moral enterprise centring on the demandingness of consequentialism. Yet, in their significance, they are also strongly political endeavours. In our world the demands of consequentialism are real: pressing moral questions with clear practical implications arise in both the national and the international arena.
Publications
- (2012), ‘The Case for Authority’. In Schleidgen, S. (Ed.): Should we always act morally? Essays on Overridingness, pp. 159-189. Marburg, Germany: Tectum
Attila Tanyi
- (2013), ‘Objective Consequentialism and the Licensing Dilemma’, Philosophical Studies 162: 547-566
Vuko Andrić
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9781-7) - (2013), ‘Silencing Desires?’, Philosophia 41 (3): 887-903
Attila Tanyi
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9407-0) - (2014), ‘Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach’, Utilitas 26 (3): 250-275
Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820814000065) - (2015), ‘Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism’, The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, eds. Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson, London: Bloomsbury
Attila Tanyi
