Precise Anchors in Negotiation

• Applicant: Professor Dr. David Loschelder
• Subject Area: Social Psychology, Industrial and Organisational Psychology
• Term: from 2015 to 2020
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 286826394

The present research project addresses anchoring effects in negotiations, more specifically, the numeric precision of first offers. We examine if, when, and why precise first offers (e.g., a salary of 48,850 Euro) exert a stronger anchoring potency than round offers (e.g., 50,000 Euro). The elevated anchoring potency should lead to more beneficial negotiation outcomes for the first-moving party. Part 1 of the research project examines the underlying mechanisms, which account for this anchor-precision-effect. We examine how (1) a more fine-grained mental scale and (2) a higher level of expertise attributed to the first-mover impact the potency of precise anchors. Part 2 of the project addresses the impact of precise anchors on experienced negotiation experts. We contrast the perceptions and behaviors of seasoned experts with relatively inexperienced negotiation novices. Part 2 also examines if particularly precise anchors (e.g., a salary of 48.746,23 Euro) unfolds distinct effects for experts and novices. The studies allow for additional insights into underlying mechanisms that were the focal point of the Part 1. In sum, the research project investigates a moderated mediation model that accounts for the anchoring impact of precise offers on negotiation experts and novices.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants
• Co-Investigator: Professor Dr. Malte Friese