Project Details
Projekt Print View

ECC - Economics of Compliance with Constitutions

Subject Area Economic Policy, Applied Economics
Public Law
Political Science
Term from 2017 to 2023
Project identifier Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 381589259
 
Final Report Year 2024

Final Report Abstract

The economics of constitutional compliance (ECC)–project has shed light on a so far largely unexplored research question: How can we measure the discrepancy between constitutional text and constitutional practice and what are the causes and consequences of the existence of such de jure-de facto gaps? The now publicly available Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database (CCCD) was produced as part of this project and allows researchers to study constitutional compliance in 175 countries on an annual basis since 1900. This wealth of new data has resulted in over a dozen published studies, which illuminate causes and consequences of constitutional compliance. Moreover, the ECC project has conducted conjoint experiments on representative samples of the German and Polish population to study rule-of-law backsliding under the Polish PiS government. Further online experiments were conducted via MTurk in dozens of democracies around the world to study how citizens react to the information that a public policy may violate the constitution. It shows that citizens support for policies declines when a court indicates that they may violate the constitution, a phenomenon that we name constitutional loyalty. The size of this effect, however, depends critically on how much trust citizens have in the courts. Moreover, lab experiments were conducted to study whether constiutitonal rules can help citizens in holding their governments accountable by coordinating collective action and to understand whether governments under limiting constitutional rules indeed are less prone to extract resources for their private benefit. Among many other insights generated in the ECC project, the concept of militant constitutionalism has been developed and empirically evaluated. Militant constitutionalism is closely related to militant democracy, a concept developed due to the experiences of the Weimar republic and Nazi Germany to prevent would-be autocrats from entering political offices. Militant constitutionalism complements militant democracy by trying to minimize the harm would-be autocrats can cause if they win an election.

Publications

 
 

Additional Information

Textvergrößerung und Kontrastanpassung