Mechanisms of epistemic change in higher education (MEPIC)

• Applicant: Dr. Tom Rosman
• Subject Area: Developmental and Educational Psychology
• Term: from 2017 to 2021
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 392753377

In an era of post truth - with rumors, fake news, and "alternative facts" spreading quickly across the globe - recipients of scientific or science-based information are constantly required to evaluate knowledge claims and weigh controversial evidence. Epistemic beliefs (individual beliefs about the nature of knowledge) are a central predictor of such processes. For example, evaluativism - a belief that the relative "correctness" of knowledge claims varies depending on their argumentative quality, evidence, and context - has positive effects on the differentiatedness of information processing and source evaluation. Beliefs that scientific knowledge consists of subjective opinions (multiplistic beliefs), in contrast, interfere with such outcomes. While theoretical and empirical works on the conceptualization and structure of epistemic beliefs are quite common, not much is known on the psychological processes involved in how such beliefs change over time ("epistemic change").The MEPIC project therefore aims at empirically validating and extending the most prominent framework in this area, the Process Model for Personal Epistemology Development by Bendixen and Rule (2004). The framework posits three interrelated psychological mechanisms for epistemic change: epistemic doubt (individuals questioning their epistemic beliefs), epistemic volition (the intention to devote sustained effort to belief change), and resolution strategies (strategies to resolve epistemic doubt; e.g., reflection or social interaction). Whereas evidence for epistemic doubt has been found in two or three studies, not much is known about the two other components, and even less is known on how individual difference factors (e.g., locus of control, cognitive ability, personality) interact with specific model components. Since these model components are hard to verbalize, a direct assessment (e.g., by questionnaires) is problematic. Therefore, a different method is chosen: Based on an existing psychology-specific intervention that has proven well-suited to evoke epistemic doubt, further intervention modules relating to the different model components will be developed. In two separate experimental studies, these modules' incremental effects on epistemic change as well as their differential efficacy, for example with regard to different personality styles, will be tested. From a theoretical standpoint, the denoted approach has the advantage that it makes model components visible without relying on self-reports. As a positive side effect, the newly designed modules may directly be used in future interventions.Since an adequate theoretical framework constitutes an essential prerequisite for designing good interventions, the MEPIC project will thus serve well to both researchers and practitioners - and, in the long term, it might even contribute to solving one of society's most pressing challenges: helping individuals to disentangle truth and untruth.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants
• Co-Investigator: Dr. Samuel Merk