Information aggregation and the role of transfers in mechanism design (B01)

• Subject Area: Economic Theory
• Term: since 2018
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 326731373

Mechanism design provides the methodological underpinnings for a very broad range of institutional design and regulation problems. The presence of monetary transfers is the main facilitator for modulating incentives but cannot be used in many instances. Building on the theoretical tools developed in the previous funding period, we shall explore fundamental challenges in mechanism and information design. A central theme of our research remains the unifying role of majorization as a powerful tool for structuring optimization problems across a broad range of economic applications, with and without monetary transfers and with or without the expected-utility hypothesis. A second cornerstone will be a unifying approach to mechanism design by privately informed principals, based on the novel concept of a neo-optimum.

• DFG Programme: CRC/Transregios
• Subproject of: TRR 224: Economic Perspectives on Societal Challenges: Equality of Opportunity, Market Regulation, and Financial Stability
• Applicant Institution: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
• Project Heads: Professor Dr. Benny Moldovanu; Professor Dr. Thomas Tröger; Professorin Dr. Mengxi Zhang, Ph.D., since 1/2026