Strategic information disclosure (B02)

• Subject Area: Economic Policy, Applied Economics
• Term: since 2018
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 326731373

Information transmission plays a critical role in the efficient functioning of markets. In this project, we study how verifiable information can mitigate distortions created by strategic agents who selectively disclose or withhold information. We will examine the implications of such strategic behavior for welfare and market efficiency. Our focus will be on the robustness of predictions, the effect of limitations in processing strategically disclosed information, and the role of verifiable information in bargaining.

• DFG Programme: CRC/Transregios
• Subproject of: TRR 224: Economic Perspectives on Societal Challenges: Equality of Opportunity, Market Regulation, and Financial Stability
• Applicant Institution: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
• Project Heads: Professorin Sarah Auster, Ph.D., since 1/2022; Professor Dr. Francesc Dilmé; Professor Dr. Bernhard Ganglmair, from 1/2022 until 12/2025; Professor Dr. Florian Hoffmann, until 9/2018; Professor Dr. Andreas Kleiner, since 1/2026; Professor Dr. Emanuele Tarantino, until 8/2020