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MOBILISE Determinants of ‘Mobilisation’ at Home and Abroad: Analysing the Micro-Foundations of Out-Migration & Mass Protest

Subject Area Political Science
Empirical Social Research
Term from 2018 to 2023
Project identifier Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 396856214
 
Final Report Year 2023

Final Report Abstract

In the MOBILISE project we asked: When there is discontent, why do some people protest while others cross borders? Drawing on the migration and protest literatures, we asked: a) whether similar factors drive the choice to migrate and/or protest at the individual level; b) how context affects this mobilisation; and c) whether these choices are independent of each other or mutually reinforcing/undermining. We employed a multi-method (nationally representative panel surveys, online migrant surveys, online protest participant surveys, focus groups, in-depth interviews, social media analysis and ethnography) and multi-sited research design. We conducted research in Ukraine, Poland, Morocco, and Argentina - countries that at the start of the project in 2019 witnessed large-scale emigration and protests - and in Germany, the UK and Spain - key destinations for migrants from these countries. In Belarus we conducted a large-scale protest survey when mass protests occurred following the rigged presidential election in 2020. Our survey data across different regional settings confirmed our main hypotheses: the infringement of citizens’ human and political rights is the most powerful mobilising factor behind protests. This was particularly visible in Belarus, where mass arrests and repression of protesters triggered further protests. Likewise, in Ukraine and Poland political motivations were a more significant factor in protests than socio-economic grievances. Further findings suggest that the decision to protest or to migrate is rooted in an economic and democratic distinction. When dissatisfied with the government, active democrats with roots in civil society networks and the economic resources to do so are much more likely to (intend to) protest than to (aspire to) migrate. In contrast, those with strong ties to diaspora groups, reinforced by the receipt of remittances, will be more likely to migrate when they perceive that their vote is pointless and when they believe that the wider economic context has become worse over time. Importantly, however, migration is often entangled with activism: some of the most seasoned protesters we interviewed also had considerable migration experience; and many migrants we interviewed had participated in protests. Some of those we interviewed abroad were activists back home and in their destination country, while for others, better material conditions abroad allowed for a level of engagement they could not afford back home. In Ukraine, our surveys and qualitative data highlighted the growing significance of citizenship as the primary identity category and mobilising factor. Repeated cycles of protests since Euromaidan have honed this inclusive identity. This finding corrects common misrepresentations of Ukraine as an ethnically, linguistically and regionally divided country. Our data acquires additional value in the context of the current war, as it allows us to retrace the emergence of an unusually high degree of societal mobilisation and engagement before and during the Covid-19 pandemic. We were thus in a strong position to analyse and contextualise the strong civil and military resistance in Ukraine after February 2022. Our online survey covering the entire period of mass protests in Belarus in 2020-21 captured an important moment in time. It helps us understand the protesters’ motivations and shows that pro-EU attitudes aligned clearly with participation in protests, even if the protest leaders tried to frame the protests in non-geopolitical terms. We conclude that the comparative study of protest, which has hardly ever focused on geopolitical attitudes as a mobilising factor. Our data also confirmed the extremely widespread use of social media as a source of information across age groups. Thus, prior to and during the protests, alternatives to the state media were used widely. Our survey also amounts to a rare empirical snapshot of the lack of societal trust in Lukashenka and state institutions. While follow-up research in Belarus is impossible at the moment, already in 2020-21 we could establish the extent to which even non-protesters lacked trust in state institutions. This means that Lukashenka’s regime is internally on shaky ground.

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