Varieties of Perceptual Content

• Applicant: Dr. Stefanie Grüne
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: from 2017 to 2019
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 398076229

During my research visit in Berkeley I plan to write three chapters of the second part of my Habilitation. In this Habilitation, I examine one of the central debates in the contemporary philosophy of perception, namely the debate between so-called “intentionalists” or “represen-tationalists” and so-called “naïve realists”. The debate concerns the question of whether veridical perceptions are states that have representational content. Representationalists affirm this claim. Naïve realists assume that veridical perceptions are relations to mind-independent entities, an assumption that most of them take to be incompatible with the claim that veridical perceptions have content. I argue that the debate between representationalists and naïve realists is confused because its participants understand the concept of content in different ways, and that hence the seemingly well-defined debate comprises a variety of different disputes. In the first part of my Habilitation I try to clarify the debate by distinguishing between three different conceptions of perceptual content, which I call the appears-looks-conception, the accuracy conception, and the possibility of inaccuracy conception. I explain how the fact that participants of the debate do not distinguish between these conceptions has led to misunderstanding and confusion, because veridical perceptions might have, or lack, content in the sense of one of these conceptions without having or lacking it in another. In the second part of my Habilitation, I will examine the central objections against representationalism on the background of the conceptual clarifications established in the first part. During my time in Berkeley, I plan to write three chapters of the second part, in which I will investigate whether veridical perceptions have content (i) on the appears-looks conception of content, (ii) on the accuracy conception of content and (iii) on the possibility of inaccuracy conception of content.

• DFG Programme: Research Fellowships
• International Connection: USA
• Host: Professorin Dr. Hannah Ginsborg