A New Political Weapon? Cyberattacks in Non-Democratic Regimes

• Applicant: Professor Dr. Nils B. Weidmann
• Subject Area: Political Science ; Security and Dependability, Operating-, Communication- and Distributed Systems
• Term: from 2018 to 2022
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 402127652

• Final Report Year: 2023

Final Report Abstract

In today’s world, modern information and communication technology (ICT), in particular the Internet, has opened up a new sphere of communication. Some argue that the most fundamental changes introduced by ICT have taken place in non-democratic countries, where ICT infrastructure and communication have become contested for political purposes, and governments and opposition actors can employ a number of tactics in the digital realm. This project has studied the governmental manipulation of the cyber-infrastructure, in particular the use of Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, for political purposes. A number of prominent examples suggest that these tactics are becoming an important weapon for political conflict. So far, however, a systematic analysis is lacking. What are the patterns of cyberattacks in autocratic countries? Who uses them, and what are the consequences? In order to fill these gaps in the scholarly literature, this project has teamed up with computer scientists that are experts in Internet measurement. With the help of these experts, the project leverages a large-scale data collection of cyberattacks on the global Internet in order to systematically measure the incidence of the attacks across and within all states worldwide. This systematic, large-scale data collection has enabled comparative research on different questions, with different results. (i) The use of cyberattacks is partly driven by political reasons. For example, we observe a higher rate during elections in autocratic countries, but also that specific content posted on news websites makes attacks against these websites more likely. (ii) Cyberattacks are only one tactic in the digital repertoire of autocratic governance. We find that during periods of high tension (for example, mass protests), autocrats become more selective in the use of these tactics, and focus on particular ones rather than using different ones in parallel. (iii) While we find no evidence that cyber-incidents lead to changes in how people perceive their government, there is evidence that their use of precautionary measures (such as the use of virtual private networks) increases when political tensions flame up.

Publications

• At Home and Abroad: The Use of Denial-of-service Attacks during Elections in Nondemocratic Regimes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64(2-3), 373-401.
  Lutscher, Philipp M.; Weidmann, Nils B.; Roberts, Margaret E.; Jonker, Mattijs; King, Alistair & Dainotti, Alberto
  
• Pulling the Strings? The Strategic Use of Pro-Government Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes. Comparative Political Studies, 53(1), 71-108.
  Hellmeier, Sebastian & Weidmann, Nils B.
  
• How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay. Comparative Political Studies, 53(10-11), 1690-1703.
  Keremoğlu, Eda & Weidmann, Nils B.
  
• How foreign pressure affects mass mobilization in favor of authoritarian regimes. European Journal of International Relations, 27(2), 450-477.
  Hellmeier, Sebastian
  
• Digital Retaliation? Denial-of-Service Attacks after Sanction Events. Journal of Global Security Studies, 6(4).
  Lutscher, Philipp M.
  
• Thin-skinned leaders: regime legitimation, protest issues, and repression in autocracies. Political Science Research and Methods, 10(1), 136-152.
  Keremoğlu, Eda; Hellmeier, Sebastian & Weidmann, Nils B.
  
• Attack or Block? Repertoires of Digital Censorship in Autocracies. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 20(1), 60-73.
  Kawerau, Lukas; Weidmann, Nils B. & Dainotti, Alberto
  
• Protest and digital adaptation. Research & Politics, 9(2).
  Strauch, Rebecca & Weidmann, Nils B.