Escalation of distributional conflict: Onset, dynamics, and group interactions
Economic Theory
Final Report Abstract
The project aimed at understanding systematic patterns that lead to an escalation or de-escalation of distributional conflict: a situation where several market participants want something that only one can have. A first set of questions addressed the role of group interactions as, for instance, in small-scale conflict between ethnic groups. Laboratory experiments show that individuals are generally more likely to initiate a conflict when entering the “fight” as part of a group than when having to fight alone as a single individual, even when being part of a group does not generate a measurable advantage in the conflict. This result, however, only holds when group members find it easy to coordinate their efforts in the conflict. Moreover, groups behave most aggressively against single individuals and in situations in which group identification is particularly strong. Fighting shoulder to shoulder strengthens the latter, resulting in a mutual reinforcement of group identity and the propensity to fight as a group. Bringing related questions to the field highlights the role of the outside option to conflict. Based on a lab-in-the-field experiment in Ethiopia, we find that minority groups are much more likely to opt for inefficient, aggressive resource allocation attempts by rejecting democratic allocation mechanisms under which they expect to be exploited by the tyranny of the majority. Equipping minorities with high power under the democratic institutions substantially reduces the likelihood of conflict. Overall, the results in this first project area demonstrate that well-designed democratic institutions can achieve efficient, peaceful outcomes even when intergroup hostility is prevalent. Moreover, breaking up existing group structures can make individuals less agitated and reduce conflict initiation. A second project area put emphasis on the dynamics of conflict. Based on a game-theoretic model and an experimental analysis, we demonstrate that individuals may enter a conflict with ideas about their environment projected from their own preferences. An adjustment of those expectations across the stages of conflict leads to a change in behavior towards escalation or de-escalation, depending on the initial beliefs. The analysis shows that taking into account the fact that contestants may ex ante be incompletely informed about the conflict scenario is crucial for understanding conflict dynamics. Besides informational aspects, the sequentiality of conflict decisions raises the question of how commitment to some early actions affects the subsequent interaction. A game-theoretic model reveals, for instance, a strong deterrence effect and hence strategic benefit from committing to a fixed resource budget for a subsequent conflict, as compared to a flexible amount of conflict investments. Altogether, the project developed valuable insights into the complexities of dynamic conflict, its emergence and the potential of various measures for conflict resolution.
Publications
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Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection. Experimental Economics, 23(3), 750-787.
Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian
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Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets. Defence and Peace Economics, 35(1), 1-23.
Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian
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Do groups fight more? Experimental evidence on conflict initiation. University of Innsbruck Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2023-16.
Ke, C., Morath, F. & Seelos, S.
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High minority power facilitates democratization across ethnic fault lines. University of Innsbruck Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2023-18
Glowacki, L., Morath, F. & Rusch, H.
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How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources. European Journal of Operational Research, 305(1), 493-500.
Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian
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On the onset of conflict and the preservation of peace. Dissertation, University of Innsbruck
Seelos, S.
