Between responsibility and reciprocity - contributions of experimental corruption research
Final Report Abstract
This project has contributed significant scientific advancements to the understanding and prevention of corruption. Our findings provide valuable insights into how different anti-corruption measures impact both social welfare and corrupt behavior across diverse cultural and institutional settings. Through a large-scale experimental approach involving a novel experimental design and nearly 3,000 participants across four countries—Germany, England, Colombia, and Indonesia—we were able to rigorously test and compare four prominent anti-corruption strategies: (1) punishing bribe offers, (2) punishing bribe acceptance, (3) punishing abuse of office, and (4) confiscating improperly obtained benefits. One of the most significant scientific advances of the study is the confirmation that intrinsic motivation plays a far more crucial role in shaping the behavior of officials than previously thought. Our results suggest that fostering intrinsic motivation among public officials can lead to better performance and higher integrity, overshadowing the effects of traditional punitive approaches. Contrary to widespread assumptions, punishment measures aimed at curbing bribery did not diminish intrinsic motivation, even in countries with high perceived corruption. This finding challenges the prevailing view that deterrence policies must be balanced against the potential for crowding out ethical behavior and instead suggests that anti-corruption strategies should place a greater emphasis on fostering positive organizational cultures. Another major breakthrough lies in the effectiveness of different punishment strategies. Punishing abuse of office emerged as the most effective method for reducing welfare losses, almost reaching the efficiency of a corruption-free environment. In contrast, measures focusing solely on bribery (either offering or accepting) were less effective at mitigating errors such as withholding services from deserving businesspeople or granting them to undeserving ones. These results highlight the importance of targeting systemic abuses rather than focusing on individual acts of bribery. Our findings carry practical applications for policymakers and public sector managers worldwide. First, the results advocate for a shift in focus from punitive measures to policies that enhance intrinsic motivation within public institutions. Strategies such as creating environments that empower officials, recognize their achievements, and offer opportunities for professional growth can be more effective in the long run. This suggests that granting officials discretion and autonomy, rather than imposing strict limitations, may be more effective. Second, the study provides empirical support for focusing not only on officials but also on businesspersons who may drive corrupt exchanges. Countries that currently emphasize punishing officials while being lenient with businesspersons may need to reconsider this approach and adopt more balanced measures. Finally, the project suggests that structural reforms, such as implementing a four-eyes principle (requiring joint decisions by two officials), can significantly reduce the potential for abuse of office and improve decision-making and welfare. Such measures can serve as actionable recommendations for public institutions. One of the most surprising and unexpected findings was the discovery that intrinsic motivation did not align with preconceived expectations based on perceived corruption levels in different countries. While it was anticipated that intrinsic motivation would be highest and bribery lowest in low-corruption environments like Germany and England, the results indicated no clear correlation between these factors. Instead, the experiments revealed that harassment — where officials excessively withhold services from businesspeople — was more prevalent in high-corruption environments, suggesting that harassment could be a more accurate indicator of systemic corruption than previously assumed. This insight could help refine corruption perception indices and inform targeted interventions.
Publications
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Intrinsic Motivation vs. Corruption? Experimental Evidence on the Performance of Officials. Elsevier BV.
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf; Grubiak, Kevin & Werner, Katharina
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Between Harassment and Favoritism – Experimental Evidence on Punishing Corruption. Elsevier BV.
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf; Grubiak, Kevin & Werner, Katharina
