Collective Self-Knowledge

• Applicant: Lukas Schwengerer, Ph.D.
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: since 2021
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 462399384

We ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Chelsea knows the best tactics against Leeds’ or ‘The book club intends to read Ulysses.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? How do groups know their own mental states? This is the question of collective self-knowledge. My aim is to find out how groups form collective self-knowledge and what we can learn from the production of collective self-knowledge for building more intellectually virtuous groups in our society. I aim to use a theory of collective self-knowledge to create more epistemically careful and humble social groups.The research project is split up into three focal points combining the development of an account of collective self-knowledge with lessons from such an account for virtue epistemology:(a) Self-Knowledge, plural and singular: The first part of the project focuses on the differences and similarities of self-knowledge for groups and individuals. My main objective here is to develop a theory of collective self-knowledge that is compatible with different accounts of collective mental states.(b) Self-Knowledge, groups and their members: The second part of the project is concerned with the access that members of a group have to the group’s mental states. My main objective here is to develop an account of member’s knowledge of group states that fits with my proposal for collective self-knowledge.(c) The role of collective self-knowledge for virtuous groups: The final part of the project centres on the influence of collective self-knowledge on developing intellectual virtues and vices in groups. I show that whether a group becomes or continues to act intellectually vicious is influenced by the group’s knowledge of its own mental states.Together (a) to (c) give us an account of knowledge of a social group's mental states both by the group itself and by its members, and elucidates what we can learn about virtuous groups from the production of said knowledge. The project therefore not only provides a contribution to social epistemology and research of collective intentionality, but it also aims at practical suggestions that lead to more intellectually virtuous social groups. Groups that are more careful and humble in forming beliefs and intentions.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants