The Moral Dimension of Doxastic Norms

• Applicant: Privatdozent Dr. Marc Andree Weber
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: since 2021
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 467739750

The aim of this project is to explain, to explore, and to establish the moral dimension of doxastic norms, where doxastic norms are those that govern our belief management. Briefly, the central idea is this: When one adopts or maintains doxastic attitudes that do not fit the available evidence, one puts other people at risk of being misinformed. The reason is that one might get asked to provide information, that one should not refuse to do so assuming that one has the relevant beliefs and there are no overriding considerations, and that one can only provide appropriate information if one’s relevant beliefs are evidentially justified. By adopting or maintaining doxastic attitudes that are not in line with the evidence at hand, one thus puts other people at risk of being misinformed and thereby causes them potential harm. As it is a moral requirement to avoid causing this potential harm, there are not only epistemic but also moral norms that pertain to the formation, retention, and revision of beliefs, as well as to the corresponding preparatory activities, such as gathering proper evidence. In other words, the doxastic domain is not a moral-free zone, it rather has a moral dimension. Being far more than a mere addendum to the familiar epistemic dimension, this moral dimension helps us to understand our motivation for adopting evidentially justified beliefs as well as the presumably prescriptive character of doxastic norms and the relation between belief formation and inquiry. This line of reasoning will be carefully spelled out in the project. In doing so, it will be explored whether an argumentation in favour of a moral dimension of doxastic norms holds regardless of which basic moral perspective is in fact correct, or whether it excludes at least some of them (a plausible candidate being a strict version of consequentialism). Deeply connected with this are the questions of how encompassing moral versions of doxastic norms are, and how much space there is for divergence between moral and epistemic versions of such norms. It will also be investigated what degree of externalism is displayed by valid moral norms about belief management, and whether invoking a moral dimension of doxastic norms has repercussions for more general considerations on internalism and externalism of justification. Moreover, establishing the moral dimension of doxastic norms affects the debates on peer disagreement and doxastic wronging, in which noteworthy parts of the reasoning rely on an epistemic understanding of such norms.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants