Retail Finance: Why and How to Regulate?
Final Report Abstract
Over the last three years, the funded DFG project has been the "initiator" of a number of papers and projects on the topic of "financial advice". The work that we carried out was shaped a lot by the interest that it received and by the immediate policy relevance, given the current discussion of how to re-regulate the industry, on both sides of the Atlantic. As planned, we investigated, in particular, whether and how "advisory agents" should be regulated, e.g., through disclosing commissions, capping commissions, or mandatory deferred commissions. Also, joint research between theoretical microeconomists and empirical macroeconomicsts (household finance) has been planned and carried out. Our work has received international attention and recognition. Besides publications, this includes invited contributions (cf the Competition Policy International article) or invited keynote lectures on this topic (e.g., the CEPR 2010 conference on Applied 10 and the upcoming annual FTC-Microeconomics conference).
Publications
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Misselling Through Agents. American Economic Review, June 2009, 99(3), 883-908
Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani
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Consumer Protection in Markets with Advice. Competition Policy International, April 2010, 6(1), 46-64
Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani
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Misselling (Financial) Products: The Limits for Internal Compliance. Economics Letters, January 2010, 106(1), 35-37
Roman Inderst
