Security analysis of quantum cryptographic schemes in the presence of side channels

• Antragsteller: Professor Dr. Reinhard F. Werner
• Fachliche Zuordnung: Optik, Quantenoptik und Physik der Atome, Moleküle und Plasmen
• Förderung: Förderung von 2008 bis 2015
• Projektkennung: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Projektnummer 63793101

Quantum cryptographic schemes can be classified by the strength of the eavesdropping attacks against which security can be guaranteed. The strongest schemes are secure even if the manufacturer of the devices has unwittingly or maliciously left a side channel, an uncontrolled leak of information. Security proofs in this scenario are so far not satisfactory because of the necessity to safeguard against unforeseen interactions. Such a proof is an aim of the current project, but also an analysis which may help to spot potential side channel loopholes in existing protocols. Since the physical nature of the side channel should remain unspecified, only tools of abstract quantum information theory can be used, including a new general inequality for the disturbance-information gain tradeoff.

• DFG-Verfahren: Sachbeihilfen