Eine Analyse zur Akzeptanz und zur Ablehnung von Transparenzsystemen unter Lebensmittelkontrolleuren und Lebensmittelunternehmern
Zusammenfassung der Projektergebnisse
Recurring food regulation infringements suggest that the appeal of the law (“Normappell des Gesetzes”) is often insufficient to prevent food businesses from rule-breaking when there are economic temptations to the contrary (illicit profits). In economic terms, this is equivalent to negative externalities that re-emerge by the breaking of rules designed to prevent them. To mitigate such market failures, governments must identify effective ways of law enforcement in the sense of behavioural risk management and prevention strategies that go beyond conventional deterrence. Instead of focusing solely on material disincentives, prevention strategies should include the promotion of prosocial norms and social control. In other words, there is need for innovative law enforcement approaches that are not only directed at getting the incentives right but also at promoting “protective factors” which shield economic agents from rule-breaking. Disclosure schemes that publish the results of public food inspection are described as such innovative prevention strategies. They are capable of mitigating market failures caused by violations of the food law by promoting not only market transparency and informed consumer choices but also social control. In this project, we focused on the behavioural drivers of food businesses and the influence of transparency systems on their compliance behaviour as well as the attitudes of various stakeholders regarding disclosure systems. One part of the project focused on the urban districts of Pankow, Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf in Berlin. At the time of data collection, the food authorities in these districts had been running a pilot mandatory disclosure system known as “Pankower Smiley”. Our results indicate that food law offences are substantially deterred by the sales losses in case of disclosure. In addition to economic deterrence, we find a remarkable influence of “social shaming” as a protective factor. The feeling of shame seems to be a behavioural determinant that influences the behaviour of food business operators beyond sales losses. This supports Braithwaite's (2000) "reintegrative shaming" theory. Braithwaite points to the benefits of both the integration of (first-time) offenders into the law-abiding community and shaming as immaterial deterrence that prevents people from rule-breaking sometimes even more than material sanctions. We also investigated the voluntary transparency scheme that was in place in North Rhine-Westphalia from 2007 to 2013. We find evidence that food businesses that participated in the scheme regretted its cancellation, both for material and non-material reasons. Finally, we carried out a survey among the approximately 2,500 food inspectors in Germany (with more than 500 responses) to investigate their attitudes regarding the introduction of transparency systems and the suitability of reintegrative shaming as a regulatory strategy. The support or lacking support for disclosure systems by food inspectors is importantly influenced by their working environment and the control style on site. In particular, the more dissatisfied inspectors are with their working conditions, the less likely they are to support transparency systems. A majority of the responding food inspectors think that respectful communication and a trusting relationship with the food businesses are crucial for effective law enforcement. This indicates that parts of reintegrative shaming are already relevant in the practice of food law enforcement. For example, a first-time violation of the law is rarely followed by a severe punishment: Instead, an attempt is made to warn the offender with lenient means.
Projektbezogene Publikationen (Auswahl)
- (2017): Der Smiley in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Deutschland): Welche Firmen bedauern die Abschaffung des Transparenzsystems? Journal of Consumer Protection and Food Safety 12(2): 115-123
Fietz, A., Grüner, S.
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1007/s00003-017-1108-y) - (2017): Does Disclosure of Food Inspections Affect Business Compliance? The case of Berlin, Germany. British Food Journal 119(1): 143-163
Bavorová, M., Fietz, A., Hirschauer, N.
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1108/BFJ-02-2016-0061) - (2018): How are Economic and Protective Factors Interrelated with Compliance of Food Businesses with Food Safety Laws in Germany? Law & Policy 40(3): 267-285
Fietz, A., Bavorová, M., Grüner, S., Hirschauer, N.
(Siehe online unter https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12105) - (2020): Ist Braithwaites reintegrative shaming Ansatz ein wirksames Mittel zur Verhaltenssteuerung von Lebensmittelunternehmern? - Eine Betrachtung aus Sicht der Lebensmittelkontrolleure. Schriften der GEWISOLA, Band 56 (Jahrestagung der GEWISOLA 2020): 65-76
Fietz, A.
(Siehe online unter https://dx.doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.305581) - (2021): Street-Level Bureaucrats and Their Attitude Towards New Policy Measures: The Example of German Food Inspectors and the Introduction of Disclosure Systems. 175th EAAE Seminar “The Wind of Change of Sustainability Standards. Sailing economic, governance, and policy perspectives”. Gargano (Italy), 13-15 May 2021
Fietz, A.
