Ambiguität in Spielen: Die Rolle von Unsicherheit in strategischen Interaktionen
Zusammenfassung der Projektergebnisse
The project looks at the issue of ambiguity, or non probabilistic uncertainty, in an interaction setting. It develops foundational aspects in decision theory and game theory, dealing in particular with the notion of dynamic consistency (of single decisions and of Ellsberg equilibria). It also provides applications of ambiguity to some particular strategic settings: certification of information, ambiguous communication and persuasion, contractual arrangements under moral hazard. Finally, issues of aggregation of ambiguous beliefs have also been given some answers. This project enhanced the Franco-German scientific collaboration in multiple ways: joint work, joint organization of conferences in Bielefeld and in Paris. At the end of the project, we decided to continue our collaboration; in the meantime, we have successfully formed a new group that also includes Queen Mary University, London, and Kyoto University, Kyoto. The new project “Ambiguity in Dynamic Environments” is also being funded by the Open Research Area in the Social Sciences.
Projektbezogene Publikationen (Auswahl)
- Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem with Incomplete Preferences, American Economic journal: Microeconomics, 7, 61–69, 2015
Danan, E., B. Hill, T. Gajdos, J.M. Tallon
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130117) - Social Robust Decisions, American Economic Review, 106, 2407–25, 2016
Danan, E., B. Hill, T. Gajdos, J.M. Tallon
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150678) - Solution concepts for games with ambiguous payoffs, Theory and Decision, 80, 245–269, 2016
Beauchêne
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9502-3) - Flexible contracts, Games and Economic Behavior, 103, 145–167, 2017
Gottardi, P. and J.M. Tallon
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013) - Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion, Theory and Decision, 82, 327–339, 2017
Ayouni, M. and F. Koessler
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7) - Kuhn’s theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games, Journal of Mathematical Economics 68, 26–41, 2017
Mouraviev, I., F. Riedel, L. Sass
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.004) - Dynamically Consistent Preferences Under Imprecise Probabilistic Information, Journal of Mathematical Economics 79, 117-124, 2018
Riedel, F., J.M. Tallon and V. Vergopoulos
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.006) - Ambiguous persuasion, Journal of Economic Theory, 179, 312–365, 2019
Beauchêne, D., Li, M. and Li, J.
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.008) - Purification and Disambiguation of Ellsberg Equilibria, Economic Theory, 69, 595–636, 2020
Decerf, B and F. Riedel
(Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01186-8)
