Aristotle's Theory of Responsibility in the light of Contemporary Theories of Moral Responsibility

• Applicant: Professorin Dr. Béatrice Lienemann
• Subject Area: History of Philosophy ; Practical Philosophy
• Term: from 2013 to 2014
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 237607633

What are the conditions under which a person is responsible for her actions? This question has been discussed intensively since antiquity. In the Aristotelian ethical writings, we find substantial contributions to this long-lasting and ongoing controversy. The goal of my research project is (1) to reconstruct systematically the theory of responsibility of Aristotle and his theory of action in general and (2) to analyze it by applying it to problematic cases of actions and to other subject such as that of character or of the emotions. Definition: A theory of responsibility is a theory of the conditions under which an agent is morally responsible for her actions, its consequences (and possibly also for her character). Approach: Although Aristotle does not present an explicit theory of responsibility in his ethics, I argue that it is possible to extract a coherent and complex theory out of his scattered remarks on the practice of responsibility. My approach is first to reconstruct the scarcely elaborated theory of Aristotle by means of accounts and concepts developed by modern theories of responsibility. Second, an analysis of his implicit theory of responsibility needs also to reflect on its historical context. Classical Greek law and its application in Athenian courts, documented by different orators (e.g. Antiphon or Lysias), seem to form an important source for Aristotle. Furthermore, Aristotle treats actions in tragedy (e.g. Sophocles: Oedipus Tyrannus) as significant when it comes to problems of responsibility. Thesis and results: The remarks that Aristotle makes on the practice of responsibility, e.g. praising or blaming persons for their actions, are original and insightful. His account proves to be very illuminating for contemporary discussions of responsibility as well as that of the compatibility of determinism and free will, because he offers an account that treats human actions and moral responsibility without introducing the concept of a (free) will. The results of the project will therefore be not only of philosophical but also of historical interest. As far as history is concerned, a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the Aristotelian views on responsibility and his theory of action will shed significant light, because Aristotle offers a philosophical conceptualization that helps make explicit both the conditions of responsibility of his time and of the public discourse of holding an agent responsible. With respect to systematic questions, the Aristotelian position proves to be highly instructive and illuminating so that it can also provide a new perspective for contemporary discussions of responsibility and of the compatibility of determinism and free will.

• DFG Programme: Research Fellowships
• International Connection: USA
• Host: Professor Hendrik Lorenz