Conceptual change as a form of cognitive dynamics

• Applicant: Privatdozent Dr. Jasper Liptow
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: from 2014 to 2018
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 246298980

The aim of this project is to develop a philosophical account of conceptual change as a form of cognitive dynamics. It is a central task of philosophy to provide an understanding of ourselves as beings who are able to mentally and linguistically represent the world and acquire comprehensive and systematic knowledge about it. For finite and fallible beings like us, the acquisition of such a world view is a lengthy process of adapting our cognitive system to the information we receive from others and to the experiences we make: a process of cognitive change. The two basic forms of cognitive change are belief change and conceptual change. Belief change is a change of a belief system that results from adding beliefs to it or deleting beliefs from it. Conceptual change, by contrast, is a change in the conceptual system that is the source of the contents of our beliefs. The study breaks new ground: Philosophical studies of cognitive dynamics as a general phenomenon have so far been confined almost entirely to the problem of belief change and philosophical studies of conceptual change have been limited to the special case of scientific knowledge. Previous investigations of the problem of conceptual change as a general cognitive phenomenon have been carried through not in philosophy but primarily in developmental psychology and science education. In a first step, the basic characteristics of conceptual change are determined and it is shown how conceptual change differs from other forms of cognitive dynamics. One of the leading ideas is that two kinds of conceptual change have to be distinguished. The kind of conceptual change that previous studies have exclusively focused on is the replacement of concepts by other, similar, concepts. This kind of conceptual change is defined by the notion of incommensurability. The other kind of conceptual change is the qualitative change of particular concepts themselves. It is claimed that this second kind of conceptual change is also a basic form of cognitive dynamics. In a second step, an account of the "logic" of the process of conceptual change is given. It is shown how conceptual change of both kinds is possible and by which cognitive abilities it is enabled. Finally, the problems of conceptual progress and rational conceptual change are tackled by building on models of intentional conceptual change that have been developed in cognitive science. It is shown that conceptual change is a form of cognitive process that can be, to a certain degree, responsive to reasons and reflective control. The overarching goal is to reach a comprehensive understanding of cognitive dynamics by unifying the theory of rational belief change with a theory of rational conceptual change.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants