Representative Democracy: Theory and Experiments

• Applicant: Alexander K. Wagner, Ph.D.
• Subject Area: Economic Policy, Applied Economics
• Term: from 2014 to 2017
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 258417644

This proposal incorporates insights from psychology into economic reasoning to better understand political processes and outcomes in representative democracy. In terms of academic disciplines, the proposal is located at the crossroads of economics, psychology and political science, and in terms of method it is grounded in both theory and experiment. Economic reasoning will be used to investigate how opportunistic, i.e. rational and self-interested, politicians change their behaviour when voters are forgetful, inattentive and have limited foresight. This approach starts from the well-defined benchmark of rational choice theory and adds psychological realism to how voters are modelled. The theoretical investigations are expected to yield clear and testable predictions. These predictions are tested in a controlled laboratory setting.The general aim of this proposal is to provide an empirically grounded model of the political process. Such a model explains under what conditions opportunistic policy makers resort to inefficient (e.g. populistic) policies. This knowledge is valuable both from a scientific and a practical perspective. It is scientifically important because it speaks to the robustness of rational choice models and informs us when we need to be careful in advancing conclusions from such models. From a practical perspective, this knowledge may perhaps contribute to devise political institutions that assist boundedly rational citizens in their decision making and limit inefficient policy making.

• DFG Programme: Research Fellowships
• International Connection: Austria
• Host: Professor Dr. Jean-Robert Tyran