The Metaphysics of Induction

• Applicant: Dr. Marius Backmann
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: from 2015 to 2020
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 276459891

In my project, I will investigate a strand in the debate on justification of induction that has not received the attention it deserves: the question whether the ontological view that there are necessary connections has an influence on the solubility of the problem of induction, i.e. the question of how to justify induction. Induction needs to be justified because it is ampliative, i.e. the content of the conclusion goes beyond the content of the premises. Induction is part of our rational behaviour, in everyday life and in scientific practice: we have to learn and generalise from experience. The ontological debate about the existence of necessary connections has become important for the solution of the problem of induction since some authors claimed that deniers of necessary connections could not solve the problem of induction, whereas necessitarians, who claim that there are necessary connections in nature, allegedly can. Moreover, some necessitarians have made the claim that their account is closer to scientific practice: they claim that scientists infer the existence of necessary connections from their data and justify some of their inferences by reference to these necessary connections. In order to investigate these claims, we have to achieve the following objectives:1. The first objective is to criticise the necessitarian attempts at solving the problem of induction in its various forms. The working hypothesis is that these attempts are unsuccessful by their own measure: they do not justify induction, but try (and fail) to dissolve the problem by reducing ampliative inferences to deductive ones. 2. The second objective is to shed light on the standards for what counts as a justification that the non-necessitarians and necessitarians adhere to. As a working hypothesis, I propose that the necessitarians seem to seek to eliminate the ampliative step, whereas the non-necessitarians seek to demonstrate why certain ampliative inferences are successful. There also seems to be a difference between scientific inductions and our everyday ones. It needs to be investigated whether the various technical and demanding attempts at a solution to the problem are applicable in our everyday practice.3. The third objective is to investigate the claim that scientists infer the existence of necessary connections from their data and then use these necessary connections to justify some of their inductive inferences. The working hypothesis is that this claim is unfounded. I will screen scientific papers from medical and chemical research with regard to their reference to necessary connections. I will collaborate with empirical scientists from the Centre for Philosophy of Science at the University of Münster in order to select and correctly interpret these papers. Having achieved these objectives, we will hopefully arrive at a broader understanding of inductive inferences, their justification, and their use.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants