Detailseite
Projekt Druckansicht

Whistle-Blowing-Regulierung: Ein einheitlicher oder maßgeschneiderter Ansatz?

Antragstellerin Dr. Esther Pittroff
Fachliche Zuordnung Accounting und Finance
Förderung Förderung von 2016 bis 2018
Projektkennung Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Projektnummer 315357377
 
Erstellungsjahr 2019

Zusammenfassung der Projektergebnisse

The central contention in this study, informed by path dependence theory, argues that a uniform approach to the design and implementation of whistle-blowing regulation may not be effective if transplanted into another country because of its unique history and culture. The purpose of this study is to test whether U.S.-style regulatory intervention can be immediately effective if transplanted into another country with different cultural attitudes and value orientations toward whistle-blowing—specifically, Germany. Our study focuses on these short-term, or what we term as ‘immediate’ effects, because the introduction of whistle-blowing laws can possibly influence long-run attitudes toward whistle-blowing. We conduct a laboratory experiment where accountants as participants assume the role of an internal auditor who discovers a material financial statement fraud and examines their whistle-blowing intention. We manipulate the presence or absence of two U.S.-style regulatory interventions: anti-retaliation protection for internal and external whistle-blowing (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and monetary rewards for external whistle-blowing (Dodd-Frank Act of 2010). A total of 98 U.S. and 84 German accountants completed the experiment. We gather data from accountants employed in a role within an organization because they are a key stakeholder who are well-positioned to detect and blow the whistle on organizational fraud and misconduct. We hypothesize and find that the provision of anti-retaliation protection and monetary rewards encourage U.S. accountants to blow the whistle. In contrast, among German accountants, where their country features a historical fear and distrust of whistle-blowers, U.S.-style regulatory interventions are less effective. Together, our findings provide strong support for the theory of path-dependence, suggesting that whistle-blowing regulation should not be uniformly transplanted without due consideration of the unique history and culture of a country.

Projektbezogene Publikationen (Auswahl)

  • Is a Uniform Approach to Whistleblowing Regulation Effective? Evidence from the United States and Germany. In: Journal of Business Ethics (2018)
    Lee, Gladys / Pittroff, Esther / Turner, Michael
    (Siehe online unter https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-4023-y)
 
 

Zusatzinformationen

Textvergrößerung und Kontrastanpassung