Servicenavigation

Project Details

Back

Projekt Print View

The Politics of Portfolio Design in Germany

Subject Area Political Science
Term from 2017 to 2022
Project identifier Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 376551581
 
Final Report Year 2023

Final Report Abstract

Changes in the jurisdictions of government ministries often attract public attention, for example the recent bundling of jurisdiction on climate policy in the Ministry of Economic Affairs or the re-establishment of an independent Ministry for Housing. However, there is little scientific research on the question of why federal governments change the design of government portfolios and what the consequences of such reforms are. As ministries play a central role in policy-making, these questions are highly relevant not only for political science, but also for society. This project systematically measured the organization and jurisdictions of all federal ministries in the period 1949 to 2015 at the level of the working units (Referate). The new data demonstrate variation in the size of the ministry administration over time, frequent jurisdictional shifts between ministries and, in many policy areas, a division of substantively related responsibilities across multiple ministries. The project explains changes in portfolio design based on government parties’ political motivations. Interviews with politicians involved in coalition negotiations and high-level civil servants indicate that reforms are driven by party politics. Preliminary statistical analyzes suggest that both office goals and substantive policy goals are relevant: Ministries are more likely to gain working units and jurisdictions if they are led by a party that is quantitatively underrepresented in the cabinet, which points to a compensatory logic related to political offices. In addition, coalition parties create overlapping responsibilities in policy areas that are disputed within the coalition, thereby creating a mechanism to monitor the lead minister in the legislative process. Portfolio design influences inter-ministerial coordination and the legislative process. Greater jurisdictional overlap empirically strengthens the coordination between ministries in the process of drafting legislation. At the same time, reforms of the ministerial structure produce considerable costs that are often ignored by politicians. The reorganization of working environment binds resources and can create frustration in the ministries concerned, especially if the reform does not promise a long-term improvement for the ministry. Overall, the project establishes portfolio design as a politically relevant dimension of coalition politics. Reforms follow a political logic driven by the interests and relative power of the governing parties. Portfolio design influences decision-making processes within the government and has substantial consequences for policy content. By contrast, efficiency concerns seem to play a subordinate role and are mainly used to justify politically motivated decisions.

Publications

 
 

Additional Information

© 2026 DFG Disclaimer / Copyright / Privacy Policy

Textvergrößerung und Kontrastanpassung