Collective Leadership. Transformation of Power after Stalin and Mao, 1952-1957 und 1975-1981

• Applicant: Professor Dr. Jörg Baberowski
• Subject Area: Modern and Contemporary History ; Asian Studies
• Term: since 2018
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 403229773

Stalinism and Maoism were regimes of terror to which millions of people fell victim. In the Soviet Union and in China, Stalin’s and Mao’s despotic rule brought destruction to society, the political system and economy, spreading fear and terror among people. There is no doubt that those brutal excesses were initiated by the very tyrants who had assumed complete political power. It was them who started terror campaigns and stopped them again. After the death of Stalin in March 1953 and Mao Zedong in September 1976, mass terror came to an end, but not the systems that had helped the tyrants spread fear. Violence was stopped, and it was the perpetrators of terror themselves, Stalin’s and Mao’s henchmen and heirs, who did it. How could they put an end to violence without changing the system of rule? And why did the tyrants' followers agree to stop the terror and keep peace among themselves? This is the topic of our research project, which is dedicated to the first years of the transformation from tyranny to collective leadership. Both in the Soviet Union of the early 1950s and in late-1970s China it was a so-called ‘collective leadership’ that engaged in crisis management and transformed a totalitarian into an authoritarian regime. After the death of the tyrants, the political systems could be stabilized only as representations of unity. In the Soviet Union, the Presidium (Politburo), the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Soviet convened hours before Stalin's death to orchestrate the transition; a month later, they chose a phrase for their rule: collective leadership. In China, Hua Guofeng, who succeeded Mao as the administrator of his ideological heritage, took over in the autumn of 1976. However, after the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping (July 1977) and Chen Yun (December 1978), the Standing Committee of the Politburo acted as a unified group, despite the conflicts in China's central leadership. Neither Stalin nor Mao had chosen a crown prince, prepared a successor, or said how they wanted the transition to take place. How did the answers that the heirs of power gave to this challenge differ in the Soviet Union and in China? Did Moscow's and Beijing's reformers learn from each other? This comparative investigation which seeks to explore how the principle of collective leadership tied together the new rulers and integrated the population, will be guided by the dimensions of rule and power enforcement, legitimacy and communication, and trust and reliability of expectations.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants
• International Connection: Australia, USA
• Co-Investigator: Professor Dr. Klaus Mühlhahn
• Cooperation Partners: Dr. Deborah Kaple; Professor Dr. Stephen Kotkin; Professor Dr. Warren Sun