Implicit biases and forward-looking responsibility
Theoretical Philosophy
Final Report Abstract
Is it justified to hold agents morally responsible (accountable) for their implicitly biased behavior? Daphne Brandenburg developed the nurturing stance as a middle-ground between the Strawsonian reactive attitude and the objective attitude. The nurturing stance is a regular part of our responsibility practices and incorporates aspects of backward- and forward-looking accounts of responsibility. From the nurturing stance, we hold agents responsible although they are not blameworthy if the agents can repair their impaired ability, like an underdeveloped self-control ability, while the impaired ability led to the immoral action. From the nurturing stance, holding an implicitly biased agent morally responsible for unintentional discrimination can be justified under certain conditions: First, the individual is not considered responsible for the act but for the lack of effort to develop the relevant ability. Second, the individual is neither directly nor indirectly responsible for the impaired ability. Third, the individual does not have the internal motivation to control prejudiced reactions. Forth, the individual is considered as not being fully blameworthy. Fifth, the individual can adequately respond to being held responsible to constitute a meaningful responsibility exchange. Regarding the fifth condition, empirical data show that agents who is confronted for biased behavior show more self-monitoring in the future. Importantly, if the confronting message supports the autonomy and competence of the receiver, as suggested by the self- determination theory, it can contribute to develop the internal motivation to control prejudiced reactions. This motivation, in turn, decreases the measureable effects of implicit prejudices and implicit stereotypes. Thereby, holding someone responsible contributes to self-control. While this shows that implicitly biased agents can adequately respond, it raises the question of how this is possible: How does an agent improve self-control if the relevant psychological influence is unconscious? When agents engage in a proactive control strategy, they can successfully shield their behavior from certain unconscious influences. Some philosophers and psychologists assume that agents need to be aware of psychological influences to successfully engage in self-control. If agents actively check for conflicts between their actions and mental states, they engage in reactive control. For engaging in reactive control, agents need awareness of those mental states which are in conflict with an action. In contrast, if agents are actively maintaining a goal in consciousness, they engage in proactive control. The top-down effects of maintaining a goal- representation in consciousness explain how proactive control shields an agent against unconscious psychological influences.
Publications
- (2020). Unintentional Trolling: How Subjects Express Their Prejudices Through Made-up Stories. Philosophy & Technology
Baston, René, & Kenyah-Damptey, Benedict
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-020-00425-4) - Proactive control and agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2022.
Baston, R.
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09830-w) - The Nurturing Stance, Moral Responsibility, and the (Implicit) Bias Blind Spot.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , First View , pp. 1 - 20
Baston, R.
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.45)
