Thick Concepts and Objectivity
Final Report Abstract
This research project examined how to best account for the meanings of so-called “thick” terms like rude and courageous. Unlike the meanings of “thin” terms such as good or ought, which are purely normative, the meanings of thick terms seem to combine normative and descriptive aspects. One interesting feature of thick terms is that their meanings seem to license inferences from certain descriptive sentences to thick sentences and from there to thin sentences, thus seemingly bridging the is-ought gap. For instance, the meaning of rude seems to license the inference from “Lisa’s remark caused offence by indicating lack of respect” to “Lisa’s remark was rude” and from there to “Lisa’s remark was pro tanto wrong”. Of course, taking this appearance at face value is problematic (not least because some thick terms are objectionable in the sense that their meanings seem to encode outdated or otherwise problematic values). But one should not ignore it either. In the course of this project, I was able to show that existing accounts of the meanings of thick terms cannot handle this and related issues in a satisfactory manner. So, instead of endorsing one of these accounts, I carefully analyzed the reasons for their failure and used the resulting insights to develop a new account: an inferentialist account of the meanings of thick terms. On this account, specifying the meaning of a thick term requires specifying the conditions of assertibility and the consequences of assertion of sentences involving this term. To illustrate, consider the following toy model of the meaning of rude: Condition of assertibility: If x causes offence by indicating lack of respect, then x is rude. Consequence of assertion: If x is rude, then x is pro tanto wrong. This account of the meanings of thick terms vindicates the above-mentioned appearance that thick terms bridge the is-ought gap or, otherwise put, that their meanings encode substantive normative commitments. Since this is a highly controversial claim, developing the details of this account was largely a matter of replying to objections and solving problems. For instance, by appealing to the idea that we can negotiate the meanings of our terms, I was able to allay the suspicion that, on my view, language can force us to accept normative falsehoods. If I am right and the meanings of thick terms do encode substantive normative commitments, then this will have important implications for our understanding of the failures of communication in divided societies (talking past each other, abuses of language, etc.) and other applied issues.
Publications
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“Inferentialism about Thick Terms”. Presented at GAP.11 at the Humboldt University Berlin on 13- 09-2022.
Irina Schumski
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“The Semantic View of Thick Terms: Inferentialism to the Rescue”. Presented at FrankMeta.4 at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management on 04-06-2022.
Irina Schumski
