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Projekt Druckansicht

Normative vs. Descriptive Accounts in the Philosophy and Psychology of Reasoning and Argumenta-tion: Tension or Productive Interplay?

Fachliche Zuordnung Theoretische Philosophie
Förderung Förderung von 2020 bis 2024
Projektkennung Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Projektnummer 448424181
 
Erstellungsjahr 2024

Zusammenfassung der Projektergebnisse

Es gab eine Zeit, in der es eine ziemlich klare Trennung zwischen den Aufgaben von Philosophen und Psychologen gab, die sich mit dem Schließen und Argumentieren befassten. Zu dieser Zeit waren Philosophen für die Festlegung und Verteidigung der normativen Grundlagen verantwortlich, und Psychologen überprüften, ob sich reale Menschen (einschließlich Wissenschaftler) an diese Normen halten. Weitere Forschungen zeigten jedoch, dass das richtige Verhältnis zwischen dem Normativen und dem Deskriptiven nicht vollständig verstandden ist und dass die beiden auf verschiedene komplizierte Arten miteinander verflochten sind. Dieses Gemeinschaftsprojekt von Psychologen und Philosophen untersuchte diese Verflechtung im Detail. Wir haben einen der führenden normativen Rahmen in der Rationalitätsforschung (den Bayes'schen) im Lichte empirischer Studien auf verschiedene Weise weiterentwickelt und darüber hinaus gezeigt, wie neue theoretische Entwicklungen weitere empirische Untersuchungen motivieren. Dabei ging es uns insbesondere um die Entwicklung eines neuen theoretischen Rahmens für die Theoriebildung und die Frage, wie dieser Rahmen (wenn überhaupt) gestestet werden kann. Insgesamt zeigt unser Projekt, dass die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Normativen und dem Deskriptiven eine produktive Rolle in der Rationalitätsforschung spielen kann und dass es zu dessen Klärung die interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit von Teams wie den unseren bedarf.

Projektbezogene Publikationen (Auswahl)

  • Bayes Nets and Rationality. The Handbook of Rationality, 253-264. The MIT Press.
    Hartmann, Stephan
  • How to Revise Beliefs from Conditionals: A New Proposal, in: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Vienna, 98–104.
    Hartmann, S. & Hahn, U.
  • Measuring Coherence, at the workshop Scientific Models and Scientific Inference, Castelveccana, Italy (invited talk).
    Hartmann, S.
  • The logic of partial supposition. Analysis, 81(2), 215-224.
    Eva, Benjamin & Hartmann, Stephan
  • Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals. Acta Analytica, 38(3), 439-451.
    Günther, Mario & Trpin, Borut
  • Coherence Considerations in Science. Research Colloquium, RUB Bochum (talk).
    Trpin, B.
  • Deliberation and confidence change. Synthese, 200(1).
    Heinzelmann, Nora & Hartmann, Stephan
  • Explanatory Power of Conjunctive Explanations. Doctoral Seminar, University of Maribor (invited talk).
    Trpin, B.
  • Howson on the Problem of Old Evidence, at the conference Probability and Reasoning: A Conference in Memory of Colin Howson, London School of Economics, London, UK (invited talk).
    Hartmann, S.
  • Lakatos, Bayes and the Role of the History of Science, at the Imre Lakatos Centenary Conference, London School of Economics, London, UK (invited talk).
    Hartmann, S.
  • Learning Causal Structure: A Bayesian Approach. 4th East European Network for Philosophy of Science Conference, Tartu, Estonia. (refereed talk)
    Trpin, B.
  • Modelling Explanatory Power. Introduction to Scientific Research Seminar (for master students of cognitive science), University of Ljubljana (invited lecture).
    Trpin, B.
  • The Myside Bias in Argument Evaluation: A Bayesian Model, in: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Toronto, 1512–1518.
    Baccini, E. & Hartmann, S.
  • Bayesian Coherentism, The Working Group in History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics and Science, University of California at Berkeley, USA (invited talk).
    Hartmann, S.
  • Coherence and the Strength of Arguments. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 45
    Hartmann, S. & Trpin, B.
  • Coherence of Information: What It Is and Why It Matters. CogSci23, Sydney, Australia (refereed virtual poster).
    Trpin, B. & Hartmann, S.
  • Coherence of Information: What It Is and Why It Matters. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Sydney, pp. 3617– 3623.
    Hartmann, S. & Trpin, B.
  • Coherence, Explanation and Truth, at the SILFS Triennial Conference 2023: Logic, Philosophy of Science, and Global Challenges, Urbino, Italy (invited talk).
    Hartmann, S.
  • Coherentism, Explanationism and Explanatory power, European Philosophy of Science Association conference in Belgrade, Serbia (refereed talk).
    Trpin, B. & Hartmann, S.
  • Coherentism, Explanationism and Explanatory Power, Workshop: How Should We Reason? at the LMU Munich (talk).
    Hartmann, S. & Trpin, B.
  • Confirmation, Coherence, and the Strength of Arguments, CogSci23, Sydney, Australia (refereed virtual poster).
    Trpin, B. & Hartmann, S.
  • Confirmation, Coherence, and the Strength of Arguments. Conference: Applied Epistemology: Virtue, Vice, and Bias. Bled, Slovenia (talk).
    Trpin, B.
  • Conjunctive Explanations. Conjunctive Explanations, 111-142. Routledge.
    Hartmann, Stephan & Trpin, Borut
  • Models of Explanatory Power: A Coherentist Appraisal. Workshop: Models of Reasoning and Normativity, RUB Bochum (talk).
    Trpin, B.
  • On the Value of Coherent Information. Conference: Epistemic Justification: Formal Epistemology Meets Mainstream Epistemology. LMU Munich (talk).
    Hartmann, S. & Trpin, B.
  • Source Code and Additional Plots for the Paper: Hartmann S. & Trpin, B. (Forthcoming) Why Coherence Matters
    Hartmann, S. & Trpin, B.
  • The Role of Coherence in Science, Introduction to Scientific Research Seminar (for master students of cognitive science), University of Ljubljana (invited lecture).
    Trpin, B.
  • The Wisdom of the Small Crowd: Myside Bias and Group Discussion. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 26(4).
    Baccini, Edoardo; Christoff, Zoé; Hartmann, Stephan & Verbrugge, Rineke
  • A New Posterior Probability Based Measure of Coherence. CogSci24, Rotterdam, Netherlands (refereed talk).
    Hartmann, S. & Trpin, B.
  • A New Posterior Probability-Based Measure of Coherence, in: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Rotterdam 2024, pp. 1494–1500.
    Hartmann, S. & Trpin, B.
  • A Posterior Probability Based Measure of Coherence, International Conference of Thinking 2024, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy (refereed talk).
    Hartmann, S. & Trpin, B.
  • Affirming the explanandum. Analysis, 84(4), 788-796.
    Trpin, Borut
  • Conjunction Fallacy as Abductive Reasoning, International Conference of Thinking 2024, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy (refereed talk).
    Trpin, B. & Hartmann, S.
  • Explaining the Conjunction Fallacy, in: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Rotterdam, pp. 5220–5226.
    Trpin, B. & Hartmann, S.
  • Explaining the Conjunction Fallacy. CogSci24, Rotterdam, Netherlands (refereed poster).
    Trpin, B. & Hartmann, S.
  • From Networks to Narratives: Bayes Nets and the Problems of Argumentation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 237-252. Springer Nature Switzerland.
    Keshmirian, Anita; Fuchs, Rafael; Cao, Yuan; Hartmann, Stephan & Hahn, Ulrike
  • Novel Predictions for Boundedly Rational Agents: A Bayesian Analysis, in: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Rotterdam, pp. 3844–3850.
    Fuchs, R. & Hartmann, S.
  • Novel Predictions for Boundedly Rational Agents: A Bayesian Analysis. CogSci24, Rotterdam, Netherlands (refereed poster).
    Fuchs, R. & Hartmann, S.
  • The Open Systems View. Philosophy of Physics, 2(1).
    Cuffaro, Michael E. & Hartmann, Stephan
 
 

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