What can we agree upon? Theorizing and modelling peace agreement content, compromise ability and their effects on armed intrastate conflicts.
Final Report Abstract
Empirical research finds that peace agreements in armed intrastate conflicts are more stable and prolong peace if they contain specific provisions, such as powersharing, justice measures or information-sharing mechanisms. Surprisingly, however, very little research analyzes when and why we see specific peace agreement content in the first place. A handful of studies investigate when individual types of provisions are included in agreements, but these studies are only loosely connected and unable to explain the overall agreement content. Consequently, we still lack a comprehensive theoretical and empirical framework to explain when and how actors achieve compromises on multiple crucial but possibly controversial issues. Likewise, we have little evidence of which variables affect peace agreement content. This project addresses these gaps by developing and empirically evaluating a theoretical framework that explains variations in peace agreement content across conflicts. We argue that the inclusion of specific provisions depends on their controversial nature and the willingness of conflict parties to compromise. We introduce the concept of compromise propensity as a latent variable reflecting the willingness and ability of parties to make concessions. Using Item Response Theory (IRT), we model and evaluate this framework, determining the relative difficulty of provisions and measuring actors' compromise propensity. Our framework links peace agreement content to variations in conflict context, dynamics, and third-party involvement. Our findings indicate that the structural context of conflict substantively alters peace processes and their content. We show that territorial conflicts are less likely to yield comprehensive accords because topics relevant in territorial conflicts are harder to settle. However, mediation seems to increase the likelihood of resolving difficult issues. We demonstrate that we can predict compromise propensity and agreement content with decent accuracy using event data of conflict dynamics. Specifically, the geographic location of fighting works as a predictor. Moreover, sanctions seem to increase compromise propensity in non-territorial conflicts but adversely affect territorial conflicts. Lastly, we discovered that compromise propensity predicts future conflict intensity following partial and comprehensive agreements, but not following prenegotiation agreements.
Publications
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Fanning or extinguishing the flames? How concessions in peace agreements predict conflict intensity. Paper presented at the Network of European Peace Scientists Annual Jan Tinbergen Conference, Dublin. June 17, 2024
Ruhe, Constantin & Meri Dankenbring
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Forecasting peace agreement content: How conflict events predict the substance of peace settlements. Center for Open Science.
Dankenbring, Meri & Ruhe, Constantin
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Fostering agreements or hampering compromise: The context-specific effect of sanctions in peace negotiations. Center for Open Science.
Volg, Iris & Ruhe, Constantin
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How mediators shape the content of peace agreements: A framework of negotiations over issues. Center for Open Science.
Ruhe, Constantin; Dankenbring, Meri & Volg, Iris
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Negotiating complex issues with little fervour? Why peace processes in territorial conflicts tend to produce incomplete outcomes
Dankenbring, Meri, Iris Volg & Constantin Ruhe
