The ethics of future persons, contractualism and directed duties
Final Report Abstract
This project investigated whether we have directed duties towards future persons and whether moral contractualism is a plausible theoretical basis for explaining such duties. Moral contractualism understands morality as a hypothetical agreement between reasoning agents in a relation of mutual recognition. According to this view, an action is morally wrong if the principles allowing the action are reasonably rejectable by the affected persons. Is moral contractualism in principle capable of explaining obligations towards future persons and if so, what substantial implications does it have? This project has shown that T. M. Scanlon's moral contractualism can be defended as a plausible theory of what we owe to future generations. It was shown that Scanlonian contractualism provides plausible answers to important challenges of intergenerational ethics, such as the socalled procreation asymmetry, the repugnant conclusion and longtermism. In addition, this project has argued that moral contractualism can also provide a solution to the non-identity problem. To this end, the project identified and critically discussed possible solutions to the non-identity problem from the perspective of moral contractualism. Two prominent strategies in the literature, the so-called types-of-persons approach and the non-comparative burden approach, were rejected and argued to be incapable of establishing directed duties towards future persons. The discussion showed that non-comparative objections are a promising basis for future people’s claims but that they should not refer to the absolute well-being of the affected persons. Instead, an appeal to other grounds of objection beyond well-being is more promising. Based on this insight, the project developed and defended a novel Scanlonian answer to the nonidentity problem based on fairness. According to this view, we owe it to future generations to treat them fairly by giving equal weight to their and our interests in natural resources. Thus, future persons have an objection to the overuse of natural resources, even though we do not share a lifetime on this planet and therefore cannot cooperate or interact directly. And importantly, this objection remains valid in non-identity cases as well. Furthermore, the project elaborated on the more concrete obligations arising from these demands. For example, the project examined obligations related to education for sustainable development, climate change and sustainability, and discussed these in the context of property rights.
Publications
-
Was schulden wir künftigen Generationen? Nachhaltigkeit und die Idee des Generationenvertrags. In: Der blaue Reiter. Journal für Philosophie, 2021, S. 70-73
Meyer, Kirsten
-
Was schulden wir künftigen Generationen? Klimawandel und Ressourcenverbrauch als Probleme der Zukunftsethik. In: Ethik und Unterricht 89, 2022, S. 4-8
Meyer, Kirsten
-
Bildung als Beitrag zur Generationengerechtigkeit. In: M. Brinkmann/G. Weiß/Markus Rieger-Ladich (Hrsg.): Generation und Weitergabe. Erziehung und Bildung zwischen Erbe und Zukunft. Beltz Juventa 2023, S. 168-184
Meyer, Kirsten
-
Generationengerechtigkeit als Wegweiser in die Zukunft? Eine Diskussion verschiedener Konzeptionen der Zukunftsethik. In: Zeitpolitisches Magazin 20 (42), 2023, S. 8-10
Meyer, Kirsten
-
Moral Education Through the Fostering of Reasoning Skills. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 27(1), 41-55.
Meyer, Kirsten
-
Das Recht auf Eigentum und die Pflichten gegenüber künftigen Generationen. Das Recht auf Eigentum, 191-211. Brill | mentis.
Meyer, Kirsten
-
Die moralischen Ansprüche zukünftiger Menschen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 72(3), 432-437.
Meyer, Kirsten
-
Navigating Nonidentity. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 29(1).
Martin, Desa Valeska
-
Moralischer Kontraktualismus und das Nichtidentitätsproblem. Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie, 11(2).
Martin, Desa Valeska
