Implicit bias: What are we missing?

• Applicant: Dr. Lieke Asma
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy ; Practical Philosophy
• Term: since 2021
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 466165190

Implicit bias is typically understood as discriminatory behavior that is caused by implicit psychological states. As a consequence, much of the research is devoted to measuring and understanding the nature of these states. In first instance, however, the problem is reflected in which (social) facts in the world we respond to: do we, unintentionally and unconsciously, use facts like gender, ethnicity, or disability that are irrelevant given our end? That means that implicit bias is first and foremost not a theoretical problem; it is not primarily about what we should believe about members of certain social groups. Rather, it is a practical problem: it reflects, given our goals and from the perspective of fairness and justice, our failure to preserve goodness in our responses. This distinction is important, because it offers alternative perspectives on: 1. The role of social norms. Scholars have argued that social norms may influence our automatic psychological processes, because of which we unconsciously discriminate. Characterizing the problem as unintentional discrimination suggests a different perspective: the fact that certain discriminatory norms are shared in our social world makes it so that we may use irrelevant social facts while thinking that they are relevant. 2. Irrationality. The issue is not whether beliefs or associations reflect the world correctly, but whether social facts are relevant given our goal. Given this, does this means that implicit bias is inherently irrational? After all, it seems that if the social facts were relevant, it would not count as bias. 3. The nature and role of bias in sound practical reasoning. Scholars have argued that biases are an unavoidable response to the fact that the data underdetermines theory. But how does this work in practical reasoning? Can we indulge in our biases in a just world? 4. The bias blind spot and countercharge. Beliefs, the common object of study, have a mind-to-world direction of fit and are transparent; this is not true of actions and practical reasoning. This suggests that the blind spot and the countercharge function differently in the latter case. 5. Moral responsibility. From the perspective of the functional nature of our responsibility practices, should we perhaps hold people responsible for the quality of their practical reasoning, i.e., how they organize their decision-making situation in order to avoid unintentional discrimination?

• DFG Programme: Research Grants