Epistemic Dilemmas, Normative Conflicts, and Epistemic Normativity

• Applicant: Professorin Dr. Eva Schmidt
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: since 2023
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 516156675

Epistemic dilemmas have recently attracted a lot of attention. To a first approximation, epistemic dilemmas are cases in which any possible doxastic response of an agent will violate an epistemic requirement. Epistemic dilemmas thus parallel moral dilemmas, where any course of action available to an agent will violate a moral requirement. Despite the recent surge of interest in epistemic dilemmas, very few attempts have been made to connect epistemic dilemmas to a wider range of issues in epistemology and normative theorizing, such as the genuine possibility of rational defeat, to normative conflicts, or the nature of epistemic normativity. The present project aims to fill this lacuna. At the center of the project lies a novel solution to epistemic dilemmas. We will situate epistemic dilemmas within a theory of intellectual self-trust and a corresponding theory of testimonial deference to others. Some call this view the agent-centered account of evidence or reasons. To be more precise, we shall argue that there is a presumption that agents who have acquired their evidence or normative reasons in the proper way act rationally when they rely on them, even when they find themselves in epistemic dilemmas. As we will argue, the solution we suggest is superior to alternative solutions that have been proposed in the recent literature. We will further address the question of whether there exists an ought simpliciter with respect to belief, which seems to be presupposed in stating epistemic dilemmas or normative conflicts, and whether we can gain insight into the nature of epistemic normativity by studying epistemic dilemmas.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants