The Relationship between the Principles of Knowledge and the Theory of Hypothesis in Émilie Du Châtelet
Final Report Abstract
Du Châtelet was an Early Modern natural philosopher and she claimed that there are two things which are of absolute certainty in human knowledge: a priori principles and experience. Her theory of hypotheses is established through recourse to these two roots of certainty. Du Châtelet advances that whenever something is not directly demonstrable on the basis of a priori principles or evident through immediate sense experience our knowledge of it is uncertain. Du Châtelet’s theory of hypotheses establishes that this uncertain knowledge is different from arbitrary opinion if it is verified through recourse to a priori principles and experience: Experience and a priori principles are the two criteria for higher probability of hypotheses. Du Châtelet’s theory of knowledge does not only bridge the Early Modern divide between rationalism and empiricism by acknowledging both a priori principles and experience as grounds of certainty – it also provides a highly original theory of certainty and probability in knowledge. Despite this important contribution to the history of Early Modern philosophy her theory of knowledge and her theory of hypotheses have not been studied in relation to each other and have been largely ignored in Early Modern scholarship of the last two centuries. The aim of this project was to fill this desideratum and to develop a study of Du Châtelet’s theory of hypotheses in its relation to her theory of knowledge in a research paper. As part of the project, I organized a two-day international online conference with the title Du Châtelet’s Scientific Methodology. Hypotheses and the Principles of Knowledge. The project as a whole made an important step towards establishing Du Châtelet as a canonical author of the Early Modern period as well as towards understanding her contribution to Early Modern philosophy and scientific methodology.
