Conatus, Drive, and the Cognition of Freedom: Spinoza's Influence on Hegel's Practical Philosophy

• Applicant: Professorin Dr. Julia Peters
• Subject Area: History of Philosophy
• Term: since 2025
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 549333036

Our current understanding of Hegel's concept of freedom is strongly influenced by Kant‘s philosophy as a central point of reference - both negatively and positively. Studies on Spinoza's influence on Hegel are almost exclusively limited to Hegel's theoretical philosophy. By contrast, this project aims to contribute to a change of perspective and to encourage us to see Hegel's practical philosophy as a continuation of a Spinozistic program. The central hypothesis of our project is that Spinoza's philosophy, in particular Spinoza's doctrine of the conatus, provides an essential source of inspiration for Hegel's practical philosophy. We want to revise the prevailing view that in his reception of Spinoza, Hegel was exclusively concerned with metaphysical questions, especially the concept of substance, and ultimately took a critical approach. By contrast, we want to show that Hegel himself pursues a Spinozist conception of drives and freedom in his practical philosophy. This conception is partly mediated by Jacobi and Fichte, partly developed from Hegel's own reading of Spinoza. It constitutes a systematically attractive conception of freedom, at the center of which lies Spinoza‘s notion of freedom as "adequate causation": To be free means to be able to recognize oneself as the cause of one's (individual, particular) action - an idea that Hegel also summarizes under the slogan of freedom as "particularity returned to generality". Our project aims to explore this concept of freedom from a philosophical-historical and systematic perspective, and thus to also make it accessible for current philosophical debates. On the one hand, our aim is to shed light on philosophical-historical connections - from Spinoza's conatus doctrine and political treatises to Jacobi, Fichte and Hegel's practical philosophy - that have received too little attention to date. On the other hand, we want to systematically outline the Hegelian-Spinozist concept of freedom - freedom understood as adequate causality -, highlight its philosophical strengths, and thereby lay the ground for introducing it into contemporary debates as a plausible position. Finally, by emphasizing Hegel’s positive reception of Spinoza, we will retrospectively shed light on Spinoza's own position and thereby also provide fruitful impulses for Spinoza scholarship.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants