NSF-DFG: SaTC: Core: Small: Demonstrating Practical Provable Side-channel Security

• Applicant: Professor Dr.-Ing. Tim Erhan Güneysu
• Subject Area: Security and Dependability, Operating-, Communication- and Distributed Systems ; Hardware Systems and Architectures for Information Technology and Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Engineering Systems
• Term: since 2025
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 553092646

Secure systems are built on abstract concepts like secret-sharing and isolation. However, these assumptions often fail in physical implementations that compute using energy. Side-channel leakage is a well-known issue, enabling side-channel attacks that exploit timing, power, electromagnetic emissions, and optical emissions from cryptographic implementations. In recent years, numerous probing models have been proposed to capture the adversary's physical capabilities and the physical effects of side-channel leakage. Probing models are crucial for secure-by-construction design methods of new secure hardware and for verifying existing designs. However, there is a significant gap between the theory of probing models and the practice of secure IC design. In this collaborative project, an international team of researchers from the US and Germany will develop, validate, and apply advanced probing models that account for physical side-channel leakage, creating practically useful design methods for provably secure IC design. A field-reconfigurable IC will be developed to demonstrate the proposed pre-silicon validation methods. The project is enabled by close collaboration through exchange visits.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants
• International Connection: USA
• Co-Investigators: Dr.-Ing. Jan Richter-Brockmann; Dr.-Ing. Pascal Sasdrich
• Cooperation Partner: Professor Patrick Schaumont, Ph.D.