Cognitive and cortixal correlates and computational modeling of spatial belief revision

• Applicant: Professor Dr. Markus Knauff
• Subject Area: Image and Language Processing, Computer Graphics and Visualisation, Human Computer Interaction, Ubiquitous and Wearable Computing
• Term: from 2008 to 2021
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 68175591

Individuals often have to revise their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence. They have to select which belief they should retain and which one they should give up. The problem has so far only been investigated outside the spatial domain. In the first funding period of the project, we introduced the new research topic of spatial belief revision and were able to show that (1) individual's spatial beliefs result from the representation and inspection of a mental model; (2) individuals hold a belief just as long as it coheres with this model; (3) alternative models are based on the Variation of the initial model; (4) individuals apply "minimal changes" to the initially constructed model; (5) Mostly, the to-be-located objects of the contradicting facts are relocated while the reference objects' initial locations are usually maintained. Further, we developed a computational model reconstructing most of the experimental findings. Currently, we run brain imaging studies using the same experimental paradigms to explore the neural basis of belief revision. In the second funding period, we want to continue and extend our work on spatial belief revision by taking into account aspects of embodied cognition, the influences of language, the effects of presentation format, and multimodality. The main research questions will be: (1) how mental models in belief revision are grounded in perceptual, motoric, or haptic experience; (2) how different grammatical structures of sentences describing spatial configurations effect the entrenchment and revision of models and beliefs; (3) how modality-specific and amodal spatial representations are revised; (4) how individuals deal with "pseudo-inconsistency": a configuration is considered to be inconsistent, because possible consistent interpretations of the premises are difficult to form. We will systemically combine cognitive experiments, functional brain imaging studies, and computational modeling. The project shall result in the first elaborated cognitive theory of spatial belief revision that explains how embodied mental models are revised on the cognitive level, how revision is algorithmically implemented, and how the processes are realized in the human brain.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants
• Participating Person: Professor Dr. Bernhard Nebel