The Design of financial markets when traders have endogenous information

• Antragsteller: Dr. Tri Vi Dang
• Fachliche Zuordnung: Wirtschaftstheorie
• Förderung: Förderung von 2008 bis 2011
• Projektkennung: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Projektnummer 90991013

Different financial securities are traded in very different types of trading institutions. Both different trading institutions and different securities may induce different incentives for traders to acquire information. In the previous proposal and the last six months I focused on the research question of how endogenous information acquisition may give rise to endogenous financial markets. Now I have started to analyze the design of financial securities and plan to explore how endogenous information acquisition may give rise to endogenous financial securities trading. And the ultimately challenging objective is then to discuss the co-design of securities and markets.This research project is coincidentally closely related to the current global banking and financial crisis and therefore, may provide suggestions and solutions for the design of a new financial infrastructure. I believe that this research agenda will be able to contribute to the academic and political debate concerning the organization, allocative and informational efficiency of financial markets as well as the need for the regulation of financial innovations and the surrounding financial institutions.

• DFG-Verfahren: Forschungsstipendien
• Internationaler Bezug: USA
• Gastgeber: Professor Dirk Bergemann, Ph.D.