'I have to do this' - Self-Ascriptions of Practical Necessity

• Applicant: Dr. Katharina Bauer
• Subject Area: Practical Philosophy
• Term: from 2012 to 2015
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 222448589

I apply for a continuation of my philosophical research project "I have to do this. Self-Ascriptions of Practical Necessity". In this project I have clarified and systemized the notion of "practical necessity" and investigated self-ascriptions of practical necessity with regard to the self-understanding and self-constitution of persons. I have distinguished between a) theories of moral necessity (with reference to Immanuel Kant and Christine Korsgaard) and b) theories of personal necessity (with reference to Bernard Williams and Harry Frankfurt) and between the following patterns of justification: a) "I have to do this, because it has to be done". b) "I have to do this, because I am, who I am". If the structure and the limits of personality can necessitate a person to do certain things and prevent her from other actions, such personal necessities can conflict with moral rules and obligations. The examination of different types of personal necessity has revealed that it is crucial to affiliate further investigations about the following questions: 1. Which ideals of autonomy and authenticity are implied in the different conceptions of practical necessity? In how far do they conflict and how can they be integrated into a successful self-constitution and into a good life? 2. Bernard Williams delivers a possible criterion for what is "personally necessary". He supposes a limit, where someone is incapable to carry out an action without becoming another person. This can also hold true, whether he could not implement his personal necessities. What does it mean to become another person? How necessary or flexible are the structures of personality? Which degrees of inner necessity or flexibility are eligible for a good self-constitution that allows for a responsible interaction with others? 3. If there is a limit of one's own self-conception, which cannot be surpassed without abandoning one's identity and the motivation to continue one's life, in how far does it have to be respected by others? In how far can people be asked for a fundamental self-reform? Are there situations where they even have to be necessitated to become another person for moral reasons or for their own sake? A continuation of the project promises to deliver significant new results, which are also applicable to concrete model cases and conflicts, e.g. cases of assisted suicide and examples of apologies in judicial proceedings.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants