Mind and Imagination

• Applicants: Professor Dr. Gerson Reuter; Professor Dr. Matthias Vogel
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: from 2019 to 2023
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 421983247

• Final Report Year: 2024

Final Report Abstract

We started the project with two hypotheses: The first states that the imagination plays a far more extensive and profound role in our human way of life than is usually assumed. The second hypothesis says that the nature of our imagination is still surprisingly poorly understood. Accordingly, the project pursued two goals: First, we explored our imagination in selected areas of our "mental life": in perception, in action, and (above all) in self-understanding and understanding others. Second, in parallel with these selected analyses of the workings of the imagination, we aimed to contribute to elucidating the nature of this ability. Some remarks on the first goal: In the course of our work, the analysis of the role of the imagination in understanding persons emerged as a central focus of the project – its role in understanding other persons as well as in self-understanding. In studying cases of understanding others, we first attempted to precisely work out the use of the imagination, especially in socalled empathetic understanding, and second tried to pin down the conditions for the success of such an understanding. To achieve this, three aspects of such an understanding had to be broken down and specified: the process of understanding itself – in all likelihood a type of simulation; the form(s) that such an understanding can take (phenomenal knowledge, propositional knowledge, or an understanding different from knowledge); and additionally, the object of understanding – particularly different types of more or less complex experiences. The outlined and defended picture particularly includes that this understanding relies on an epistemically controlled use of sensory imaginings. Moreover, it was argued that a comprehensive understanding, if successful, involves being able to grasp how it feels to have the experience in question (a kind of "reenacting"). We also believe we have gathered good reasons for the claim that such understanding, precarious as it often may be, can indeed succeed. There are, of course, significant challenges, such as performing a kind of "perspective-shifting"and the imaginative overcoming of the unfamiliarity of the other person's experience. However, we do not see any fundamental obstacles to such (empathetic) understanding. As already indicated, due to the project's new focus on processes of understanding, we also concentrated on the role of sensory imaginings for self-understanding. The guiding idea is that, in virtue of their experiential quality, sensory imaginings have an affective significance that can help us to develop an adequate knowledge of our preferences – especially in the context of decisions that concern transformative experiences (such as the decision to become a parent or to live in a foreign culture). A few remarks on the second goal – the work on the question of the nature of imaginings and the ability of the imagination: We set out to pursue two fundamentally different theoretical strategies as complementary answers: On the one hand, starting from Aristotle’s remark that perceiving and moving animals are also imagining animals, we attempted to specify the function – and thus also the nature – of the imagination for living beings. The theoretical framework for this was provided by a naturalistic bottom-up strategy. On the other hand, we defended the idea (more of an element of a top-down strategy) that imaginings in self-conscious human beings should be conceived as already transformed due to their conceptual abilities. Such sensory imaginings are conceptually structured mental actions – thus nothing we share with non-human animals, but rather characteristics of our human way of life.

Publications

• »How to Choose a Horse – in Pretend Play«, in: Junkyard of the Mind, 1.9.2021
  Backhaus, Eva Lucia
  
• Der menschliche Blick - über den Zusammenhang von Wahrnehmen und Handeln. University Library J. C. Senckenberg.
  Backhaus, Eva Lucia
  
• »Remarks on the Epistemic Role of Sensory Imaginings«, in: Junkyard of the Mind, 2.11.2022
  Reuter, Gerson
  
• Concurring Emotions, Affective Empathy, and Phenomenal Understanding. Passion: Journal of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, 1(2), 108-124.
  Werner, Christiana
  
• Empathic Understanding. Empathy’s Role in Understanding Persons, Literature, and Art, 1-22. Routledge.
  Petraschka, Thomas & Werner, Christiana
  
• »Immaginazione e λόγος«, in: C. Diotto, M. Ophälders (Hg.). Formare per trasformare. Milano: Mimesis (2023), S. 69-98.
  Gregorio, Serena
  
• »What does it mean to understand someone? Conference report«, in: Junkyard of the Mind, 11.10.2023
  Gregorio, Serena
  
• “Tell me, how does it feel?”. Empathy’s Role in Understanding Persons, Literature, and Art, 174-196. Routledge.
  Werner, Christiana
  
• Imagination and its role in understanding the experiences of others. Imagination and Experience, 318-345. Routledge.
  Reuter, Gerson & Vogel, Matthias
  
• On Mary's colour perception and soldiers at war – the knowledge we gain from complex experiences. Imagination and Experience, 198-214. Routledge.
  Werner, Christiana
  
• Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices. Philosophical Explorations, 27(2), 197-211.
  Werner, Christiana