Agency problems in securitizations
Final Report Abstract
Due to substantial problems in the securitization market, the EU has implemented several postcrisis reforms. An important question is whether these reforms are able to mitigate agency problems inherent in the market. In our research projects, we document empirically that the regulations have desirable effects on the one hand and problematic effects on the other. Regarding the minimum retention requirements as part of the CRD IV, we find the beneficial effect that it improves the originating banks’ behavior towards the loans with respect to all monitoring and work-out relevant actions of the bank. For example, loans tend to be rated and evaluated more often and work-out faster and more efficient. As we do not find evidence for adverse selection into different types of deals, we conclude that the regulation decreases moral hazard. Concerning the European Securitization Regulation, including the concept of simple, transparent and standardized (STS) securitizations, we find that the regulation misses its aims to some extent, which leads to problematic developments. Instead of improving the investors’ risk assessment as intended, the existence of the STS quality label leads many investors to rely on the label instead of a proper risk assessment of the deal. In fact, while the existence of the label is irrelevant for the performance, the specific features improve loan performance significantly. These in turn, are neglected by the investors. Summing up, we highlight the threat that investors as before the financial crisis („AAA“) once again rely too heavily on a label instead of analyzing the complex financial product before investing. This, however, is a problematic development that the EU aimed to prevent with this regulation particularly. This is especially relevant since we also find that originators use low prospectus comprehensibility to hide poor performance and that investors do not account for the comprehensibility sufficiently when pricing these complex financial securities. Overall, our results advance the knowledge on risk retention, the complexities of financial securities, and the comprehensibility of disclosure documents, ultimately contributing valuable insights to academics, regulators and professionals.
Publications
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Essays on Agency Problems in Securitizations. Dissertation.
Osterkamp, Werner
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Simple is simply not enough—features versus labels of complex financial securities. Review of Derivatives Research, 27(2), 113-150.
Hibbeln, Martin & Osterkamp, Werner
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The Impact of Risk Retention on Moral Hazard in the Securitization Market. Journal of Banking & Finance, 163, 107153.
Hibbeln, Martin & Osterkamp, Werner
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The impact of risk retention on the pricing of securitizations. Review of Derivatives Research, 28(1).
Hibbeln, Martin & Osterkamp, Werner
