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‘In the shadows of autonomy’: Decentralization, municipal decision-makers and local contexts in Ghana and Rwanda

Subject Area Empirical Social Research
Term from 2020 to 2024
Project identifier Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 439734012
 
Final Report Year 2024

Final Report Abstract

For a long time, work on decentralization in Africa focused on changing the formal structures in order to implement decentralization. Since the main intention of decentralization is to target services to those on the ‘margins’, we seek to understand how local institutions make decisions and provide services to local citizens also in rural and impoverished locations. Against the background of preliminary work in Ghana, the focus is on the elected local officials, the councillors. They represent the population and are formally responsible for determining local policy and monitoring its implementation. Against the backdrop of widespread scepticism about the effectiveness of decentralization in Africa, we selected Ghana and Rwanda as two countries that are regarded as success stories in the development policy debate. Despite their positive assessment, they have significantly different political structures, which offers additional options for comparison. Ghana has long been a darling of the West as it passes for a good example of democracy with changes in power at the national level, elected councillors, and appointed mayors at the local level. The largely authoritarian state of Rwanda enjoys international praise for phenomenal economic progress and performance after the severe devastation of the 1994 genocide. Since 2000 Rwanda has promoted local self-governance with local election of councillors and mayors. Formally, in both countries, decentralization includes a consequent devolution of formal decisionmaking power to the local level. The councillors repeatedly emphasize that they translate local expectations and needs into concrete policy as far as possible. However, we observe structural limits. The main funds come from the central government as earmarked funds for defined purposes. They provide the basis for the implementation of typical local development infrastructural activities. At the same time, they limit possible deviating local prioritization. The preparation of the budget and the subsequent implementation of the measures are in the hands of the administration, the influence of the councillors on the specific local objectives remains quite limited. In addition, the central government can significantly influence policy and decision-making directly through the appointed local officials, like the appointed mayors in Ghana or the executive secretaries in Rwanda. A special feature of the Rwanda system is that all activities of the local administration are fixed in performance contracts between the local administration and the central government (imihigo). They are publicly displayed, and people can follow whether they are implemented. The councillors are well aware of their limitations. Thus, they look for alternative ways to react to local demands and needs in order to fulfil their role as elected representatives. In both countries, other development actors, especially NGOs, and in Ghana also international and foreign governmental development organizations, are important potential partners for local councillors. Councillors act as brokers approaching development organizations and making project proposals. They also help to realize the specific projects. In Ghana, this usually takes place outside the administrative structure. Sometimes councillors also mediate between development organizations and the administration. Local contacts in Ghana are, for example, local self-help organizations. In addition, active councillors also offer personal support to citizens from their constituency. In Rwanda, too, councillors act as intermediaries to development organizations. Here, every additional activity must be included in the performance contracts (imihigo). This is in the interest of the administration, which can emphasize its particular efficiency with additional projects. At the same time, control over all local activities remains with the state institutions (Sabbi/Ndikubwimana, in print). Potential dissatisfaction of the people in both countries points at the mayor. In Ghana, local deficiencies are linked with the governing party at the national level that appointed the mayor. In Rwanda, the local population could fail to re-elect the mayor and the national government is less affected by local dissatisfaction. Despite the different political systems and the still strong influence of national government, decentralization creates in both countries a certain impression of local democracy.

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